Immer wieder und diese Tage besonders oft und stark erklingen Vorfwürfe an die Adresse Israels, seine militärische Antwort auf die kleinen niedlichen Kassam-Raketen sei unverhältnismäßig (disproportionate). Von einigen Texten, die dagegen argumentieren, möchte ich zwei verlinken, die das besonders klar und klug vermitteln.
Einmal von Shmuel Rosner in der „Slate“ (Link), daraus eine Stelle:
Israel’s failure in Lebanon was maddeningly visible, but the failure of the international community to provide better solutions is no less problematic. Security Council resolutions were implemented poorly, and the international forces sent to execute them have failed to achieve their goals. („[T]here will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon.“) Similar international community failures led to Israel’s decision to go to war against Hamas in Gaza. The Egyptians and other mediators have failed to persuade Hamas to end the shelling of Israel. Those assisting the Palestinian Authority failed to prevent Hamas from taking over Gaza; they also failed to provide a strategy to tame Hamas after the group took control and to help the authority resume power in the territory. Complaining about Israel’s failures is easy; providing alternatives is more difficult (except for those who think that Israel should just get used to living under rocket fire).
No reasonable, moderately compassionate human being can ignore the suffering of Gazans under Israeli attacks. But such is the tricky nature of modern warfare: How do we measure proportionality without reducing the concept to an impossibly pedantic tit-for-tat? (How would it work? For every rocket launched into an Israeli town, Israel would retaliate by launching a similar rocket? And even then, how could we achieve proportionality without making sure that Palestinians in Gaza have the same alarm systems and comparably effective shelters?) How do we measure „success“ in a situation where no side is likely to bring real closure to a volatile situation?
Und einmal von Alan Dershowitz im „Christian Science Monitor“ (Link). Daraus zitiere ich den Schluß:
There have been three types of international response to the Israeli military actions against the Hamas rockets. Not surprisingly, Iran, Hamas, and other knee-jerk Israeli-bashers have argued that the Hamas rocket attacks against Israeli civilians are entirely legitimate and that the Israeli counterattacks are war crimes.
Equally unsurprising is the response of the United Nations, the European Union, Russia, and others who, at least when it comes to Israel, see a moral and legal equivalence between terrorists who target civilians and a democracy that responds by targeting the terrorists.
And finally, there is the United States and a few other nations that place the blame squarely on Hamas for its unlawful and immoral policy of using its own civilians as human shields, behind whom they fire rockets at Israeli civilians.
The most dangerous of the three responses is not the Iranian-Hamas absurdity, which is largely ignored by thinking and moral people, but the United Nations and European Union response, which equates the willful murder of civilians with legitimate self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
This false moral equivalence only encourages terrorists to persist in their unlawful actions against civilians. The US has it exactly right by placing the blame on Hamas, while urging Israel to do everything possible to minimize civilian casualties.
Update: Doch noch ein Text zum selben Thema, von George Jonas, in der „National Post“ (Link). Einige Fragmente daraus:
Following a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert yesterday, President Shimon Peres spoke to the press. „Nobody in this world understands what are Hamas’s goals and why it continues to fire missiles,“ Peres said. „This shooting has no point, no logic and no chance.“
I hesitate to say that I understand something about the Middle East that Peres doesn’t, but Hamas’s goals seem clear to me. The first is the destruction of the Jewish state. The second is to make it seem right.
In fairness, Hamas has never made any bones about its first goal. As the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, put it in an interview with journalist Flore de Preneuf in August, 2001, „Hamas was established to resist and kick out the occupier. All of Israel, Tel Aviv included, is occupied Palestine.“
It would be difficult to speak more plainly. Ironically, the person who did, also in the watershed year of 2001, wasn’t even a spokesman for Hamas but for Yasser Arafat’s „moderate“ Palestinian Liberation Organization. „Our strategic goal is Palestine from the [Mediterranean] sea to the [Jordan] river,“ said Faisal al-Husseini in a moment of candour. […]
Israel suffered 77 dead at the hands of terrorist bombers and snipers in the first six months of 2001 alone. Yet when an Israeli helicopter gunship carried out a targeted attack against a Hamas office in Nablus that tragically killed two passing children in the street in addition to six Hamas officials, Powell reacted in a predictable manner. „This kind of response is too aggressive,“ he told CNN’s Judy Woodruff. „It just serves to increase the level of tension and violence in the region.“
Hamas firing rockets „has no point, no logic and no chance,“ President Peres said yesterday. With respect, it does. The point of Hamas’s rockets is the expectation that someone like Colin Powell will say that Israel’s self-defence increases „the level of tension and violence in the region.“ As such, it has an excellent chance, I fear.
Jetzt stimmt der Titel des Postings nicht mehr – dreimal ist nun mal mehr als zweimal. Das lasse ich aber weiterhin so stehen.